White paper: Have we learned our lesson on school rebuilds?

Written by
Frazer Reynolds
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November 16, 2026
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7
Successive English school rebuilding programmes have been right on the need but slow on delivery. This paper examines whether the new £38bn commitment and the CF25 framework will break that pattern.

Every government since the early 2000s has launched a flagship programme to renew England's school estate, and each has been broadly right about the need. What's proved harder is finishing schools on the date promised. This paper suggests how we can break that cycle.

A recurring pattern: promises made and abandoned

Building Schools for the Future (2003) aimed to rebuild or renew every secondary school within about fifteen years. It was cancelled in 2010, having reached a fraction of that. 

The pattern repeated. The Priority School Building Programme replaced it with a narrower remit covering 537 schools. Construction Framework 17, followed by CF21 (2017–2021), became the department's standing procurement route, worth around £7bn over four years. The School Rebuilding Programme (2020) promised roughly 500 schools over a decade, at about 50 a year, before becoming the government's main response to RAAC in the estate.

The Department for Education's own record shows the pattern clearly: under the School Rebuilding Programme, it had projected 83 construction contracts awarded by March 2023. The BBC reported that just 62 had been issued by June 2024, with the National Audit Office separately noting the department's own completion forecasts had already been revised down. 

None of these programmes failed because the diagnosis was wrong. What repeatedly slipped was the process connecting a funding announcement to a finished classroom.

The funding gap, in one set of numbers

The scale of the problem was never hidden. A 2023 National Audit Office review found around 38% of school buildings, roughly 24,000 of them, had already exceeded their original design life.

More than 700,000 pupils were being taught in schools their own responsible bodies considered in need of major refurbishment or rebuilding – some dating from before 1940. The DfE itself has estimated that around £7bn a year is needed to properly maintain, repair and rebuild the estate. 

Actual capital funding has run well below that: averaging around £2.3bn a year between 2016 and 2022, and closer to £3bn a year since 2020. The discovery of RAAC across hundreds of school buildings in 2023 turned that funding gap into an overnight safety crisis; more than 100 schools in the current rebuilding programme are RAAC-affected.

In February 2026, the government responded at the scale the sector had been asking for. The Education Estates Strategy committed £38bn of capital investment between 2025-26 and 2029-30, the highest level since 2010, including almost £20bn for the School Rebuilding Programme through 2034-35 and a further £710m Renewal and Retrofit Programme.

That answers the funding question for the time being at least – but are the requisite mechanisms in place to turn that capital into completed school buildings?

Is CF25 an improvement on its predecessors?

The current framework, Construction Framework 2025 is the mechanism through which most of that new investment actually reaches a building site.

It succeeds CF21, spans two value bands and ten regional lots, and is worth an estimated £15.4bn over an initial six years, with an option to extend to eight. It widens the supply chain and draws offsite and modular specialists into the mainstream framework for the first time.

It's also, so far, a case study in the same pattern this paper has traced through three earlier programmes. The plan was for CF25 to be live from 1 December 2025, immediately following CF21's expiry, with no gap in the pipeline. In practice, the standstill period on one of the two national high-value lots was extended in December, and the official guidelines were not issued until January 2026, roughly five weeks after the department's own original date.

Set against a single procurement, five weeks either side of a standstill period is unremarkable, and the department deserves credit for moving from tender to a 23-firm award within roughly nine months. But in the context of the history above, it's the first hesitation in a well-funded, well-designed programme, arriving before a single school has been delivered through it.

‍Developments are being watched carefully by every contractor and supply-chain partner who has to decide, months in advance, how much capacity to commit against the dates the department publishes.

Why stop-start inflates costs on DfE construction projects

Contractors don't wait for a signed contract before preparing to deliver it. Pre-construction teams, designers and specialist trades are typically assigned months ahead of an expected award, priced against the schedule the client has published.

That's what a framework this size is meant to encourage: confidence to invest ahead of demand, rather than scrambling once work lands. But when published dates slip, that confidence is what erodes first. Industry bodies were candid about exactly this during the early years of the School Rebuilding Programme, and sustained cost inflation over the same period made some contractors more cautious about committing capacity to a schedule they couldn't fully rely on. 

Teams stood up and then stood down don't wait patiently for the next call: specialist staff get redeployed, subcontractor capacity is offered elsewhere, and rebuilding that capability later, once the delayed contract lands, costs more than it would have the first time. £38bn is a genuinely large commitment, but a capital figure that size is only worth what the industry believes the dates attached to it are worth. 

Every cycle increases what the next generation of schools costs to deliver, working directly against the value-for-money case that justified the investment.

Keeping the promise: the need for digital discipline

The Education Estates Strategy already points the right way on one front. From autumn 2026, responsible bodies will submit standardised annual returns against new School Estate Management Standards, feeding a new digital service, Manage Your Education Estate, giving the department and sector a shared, current view of condition and progress rather than a patchwork of local records.

The same discipline needs to extend to how information moves when a framework changes hands, and CF25 is precisely that moment. Every school delivered under CF21 generated condition surveys, coordinated design models, as-built records and COBie handover data. Where that information doesn't transfer cleanly from one contractor, framework or funding cycle to the next, part of the original investment is effectively spent twice: once to create it, and again to recreate it once it's been lost at handover.

Government can't insulate a £38bn, decade-long programme from every external pressure on cost and capacity. But it can control how much of its own information survives the journey between frameworks, and how quickly a new contractor or responsible body can pick up an existing project without starting large parts of it again from scratch. 

Structured information management alone won't guarantee a standstill period ends on time. But it removes one recurring, avoidable cause of delay and rework that has hindered every school rebuilding programme to date.

How Majenta is helping contractors get CF25 projects over the line

Majenta provides information management, 3D and MEP modelling, 4D visualisation and planning and Scan to BIM services across the stages that turn a signed framework place into a finished, handed-over school, exactly where the risks in this paper, lost time and lost information, either compound each other or get resolved.

Around 80% of the contractors named to CF25's national high-value lots already work with Majenta on live education projects. That gives Majenta a current, direct view of how information actually moves between design, construction and handover on the schemes this framework exists to deliver, and a track record of keeping that information intact when programmes, funding or delivery teams change around a project.

A funding commitment is only as good as the continuity that carries it from one framework to the next. 

Talk to Majenta about keeping that continuity intact across CF25, so the £38bn committed in February 2026 turns into schools delivered against the dates promised, not information recreated at every handover.

Key contact

Priya Flora, Partnership Manager, Majenta Solutions

Sources:  

The Building Schools for the Future Programme: Renewing the secondary school estate - NAO report

Priority School Building Programme (PSBP) - GOV.UK

School building framework: winning contractors announced - GOV.UK

School buildings: construction framework 2021 - GOV.UK

School rebuilding programme: methodology for prioritising the first 50 schools - GOV.UK

'The lights go out when it rains' - school rebuilding plan missing targets

School buildings and capital funding (England) - House of Commons Library

Foundations of Learning: replacing RAAC and securing school buildings

Education Estates Strategy A decade of national renewal - GOV.UK

Construction Framework 2025 - Find a Tender

Award Construction Framework 2025 - GOV.UK

DfE appoints 23 firms to £15.4bn CF25 schools framework - Industrialised Construction

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